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ABSTRACT: This study approaches the politics of urban development from within the 
framework of the emergence of a new multi-scalar growth regime and the path-dependence of 
the Korean developmental state. Through a case study of the Songdo New City development 
in South Korea, this study looks at how the scalar division of labor among various actors has 
interacted with the emergence of a multi-scalar growth regime. We focus on the logic by 
which different scales of governmental and non-governmental actors cooperate and, at the 
same time, compete with one another for authority over economic development. Our findings 
demonstrate, first, that the new regime resulted from the emergence of downward state-
rescaling to the local scale and of private business as a key actor. Second, the regime actors 
have been involved in scalar tensions and have constantly negotiated the scalar divisions of 
labor among them. This research provides a contextualized example of a spatio-temporal 
logic in which statehood has been transformed into a network.  
KEY WORDS: growth regime, the politics of urban development, rescaling, Songdo New 
City, scalar tension 
 
Introduction 
This paper analyses the politics of urban development of the Songdo New City in 
South Korea under the lens of regime theory,1 teasing out the complex and evolving 
                                                     
1 All of the regimes we talk about are various kinds of ‘growth’ regimes, where an earlier, post-war state-led 
developmentalist regime existed that has been supplanted by a more multi-scalar-oriented growth regime. 
Growth regimes are one of several different urban regime types. A typology by Stone (1998, 1993) includes 
maintenance regimes, development regimes, middle class progressive regimes, and regimes devoted to lower-
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architecture of a growth regime. It focuses on the rearrangement of scalar2 divisions of labor 
among multi-scalar actors of a regime-in-operation. The Korean politics of urban 
development has witnessed the emergence of a new regime and the continuing path-
dependence of the Korean developmental state.3 The Incheon city government initiated the 
Songdo International City, located 65 kilometers west of Seoul; later in 2003, the nation state 
designated it a part of the Incheon Free Economic Zone4 (Kim, 2006). Through an analysis of 
the process of the implementation of the Songdo development over time (1986 to 2010),5 this 
paper analyses how new multi-scalar actors (i.e., the Incheon city government, international 
developers, and civic organizations in addition to the nation state) come to form a growth 
regime and how scalar tensions arise within the dynamics of collaboration and competition.  
As its legacy as a developmental state implies, the Korean state has initiated, 
controlled, and managed urban development by hiring and collaborating with domestic 
private developers. In the context of the development of new towns and Free Economic 
Zones,6 the nation state has been the predominant leader within the country thus far. 
Therefore, the analytical framework of the growth regime (Stone, 1989) is helpful only in a 
comparative sense in noting the differences between the western context and that of Korea 
and other Asian countries. 
In the case of the Songdo development, however, we noticed the birth of a growth 
regime especially instrumental growth regime for project accomplishment as defined by 
Stoker and Mossberger (1994). The city government and international developers 
collaborated and competed with the nation state as key actors, and their common interests 
emerged as a crucial driving force of the growth regime. As the regime actors are multi-scalar, 
the tension and the dynamics call for a rereading of the urban growth regime and state 
rescaling within the Korean context. 
In this paper, we attempt to answer the question: How has the arrangement of a new 
regime simultaneously formed and been formed by scalar divisions of labor between different 
actors? How has the politics of urban development interacted with the detailed scalar 
geography of the state? Our approach involves a slight shift in the emphasis of the argument 
away from the western urban growth regime, which focuses on actors’ collaborations, toward 
urban economic growth. We, rather, focus on the logic by which different scales of 
governmental and non-governmental actors cooperate and, at the same time, compete with 
one another for authority over economic development. We see the convergence (the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
class opportunity expansion. Development regimes are concerned with changing land use to promote growth. 
2 Scale in this study refers to the range of social arrangement of and interactions between levels of organization. 
Scales are both materially and socially constructed (Reed & Bruyneel, 2010). As Brenner (2009) points out, 
rescaling is distinguished from other elements of state restructuring, including networking, by involving the 
function of spatial strategies. 
3 The concept of the developmental state has been controversial. In this study, it is comprehensively defined as a 
nation state that has led by pursuing economic growth as a top priority. East Asian states including Japan, South 
Korea, and China are representative examples.  
4 In addition to Songdo, the Korean government has designated five other areas nationwide as Free Economic 
Zones. The Korean nation state designed and implemented the Free Economic Zone policy after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1998. The nation state’s aim was to create new growth engines within the service sector 
similar to the free economic zones of Shanghai and Dubai. 
5 This study is based on the results of a collaborative research project on new town developments in South 
Korea that has been entirely funded by the Korean Research Institute for Human Settlement. Geographically, 
Songdo belongs to the city of Incheon. 
6 The development of new towns and the development of Free Economic Zones (FEZs) are different from one 
another. Free Economic Zones have exceptional deregulation and tax benefits that new towns do not. Songdo 
New City has been defined as both, at different times, first as a new city and then as a Free Economic Zone. 




emergence of the new growth regime) and the divergence (the path dependence of the nation 
state’s dominance and ideology) between the growth regime in the western contexts and the 
Songdo case. By looking at the dialectic interaction between path dependence and a new 
form of network, this research contributes to growth regime theory by highlighting the 
formation of growth regimes in non-Western countries, where the state has historically played 
a predominant role in economic policy. Through an actor-centered approach generated from 
archival analysis and in-depth interviews, our findings demonstrate how growth-oriented 
Korean statehood has given way to a new multi-scalar growth regime and how devolution has 
influenced the spatial strategies of the regime’s actors.  
To conduct these analyses, we organize the rest of this paper as follows. In the first 
section, we discuss the theoretical framework through a rereading of the regime theory 
literature in the context of the developmental state. Next, we briefly introduce our research 
method and the background of the case. In terms of empirical findings, we first examine how 
the multi-scalar growth regime formed and what relations key actors had with others in the 
rearrangement of the scalar division of labor. Second, we address the scalar tension between 
the urban government and the nation state regarding the Incheon Free Economic Zone 
Authority. The last findings section investigates who plays the role of coordinator in the 
context of the politics of the new growth regime. We seek out the academic and policy 
implications of the findings in the concluding discussion. 
 
 
Urban growth regime in the developmental state 
The politics of urban development in South Korea has been distant from the regime 
approach as a result of a lack of partnership and of direction on the part of private business in 
the Korean context. In recent years, some studies (Bae and Sellers, 2007, for example) have 
noted changes that have made the Korean context more akin to western ones. Regime theory 
(Stone, 1989) has been predominant in the literature on the politics of urban development for 
decades in western societies (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). The concepts of the urban 
regime include a perspective informed by political economy that “rejects both pluralist 
assumptions that governmental authority is adequate to make and carry out policies, as well 
as structuralist assumptions that economic forces determine policy.” (Mossberger and Stoker, 
2001: 812). Power as part of these concepts refers to the political power to act and to achieve 
an outcome rather than to power over others. 
Regime theory has focused on the collaboration between governmental actors and 
non-governmental actors (businesses in particular) where property development-led urban 
growth has been a common interest between these actors.7 A regime is an informal yet 
relatively stable coalition that provides other actors access to institutional resources. The 
combined group of government and private actors establish authority over the populace, 
which governmental actors provide, and over national economic resources, which private 
actors give. Regime theory puts forth exchange politics, the arrangement of such exchanges 
of the access to political and economic resources, as a main condition of regime politics. 
The entrepreneurial local government8 accommodates local businesses’ pursuit of 
profit (exchange value) via real estate development (Harding, 1995), as it is interested in 
financial benefits as well as the political advantages that an urban development project can 
create (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994). To attract mobile capital, new residents, and tourists, 
the local government has pursued a type of urban growth that improves upon the landscape 
                                                     
7 Urban growth machine theory (Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987) has also focused on the same theme. 
8 Peterson (1987) has demonstrated how the local government pursued developmental policy rather than 
redistributional policy in order to maintain compatibility with business interests. 
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and infrastructure. A main consequence of the existence of an urban growth regime is a 
conflict between use values that local residents pursue and the exchange value that economic 
and property development are interested in (Logan and Molotch, 1987). The regime approach 
pays special attention to how the structure of society and existing power relations privilege 
particular actors in the pursuit of certain interests within a coalition (Blanco, 2013; Stoker 
and Mossberger, 1994). 
In the case of the city of Atlanta, regime politics has demonstrated three 
characteristics. First, non-governmental actors not only control most investment activities, 
but also manage most social-associational life. A number of previous studies have 
emphasized the importance of businesses for economic development and local growth, 
although the involvement of businesses is not necessarily a dominant one (Stone, 1987; 
Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). These same studies have shown that the role of the 
government shifted from commanding action to inducing action. Second, the emergence of a 
growth regime formation is a process of social-coproduction. The appropriate form of growth 
regimes depends on the context within which they are established, including what are 
considered the main urban problems faced by an urban environment. 
Regime theory has been contested on the basis of whether it is also a useful approach 
in the context of Western countries. While Imbroscio (2003) has criticized conceptualizing 
growth regime theory in a rigid and static manner, Davies (2003) has considered concept 
stretching, arguing that regime theory is not an appropriate approach for the analysis of urban 
coalitions in the context of Davies’ study of the UK. Stone (2004), however, refused to focus 
on whether a given locality or set of localities pass a litmus test to qualify as a growth regime. 
Rather, he focused on how governing arrangements take shape and what motivates key actors 
to pursue an agenda.  
The politics of urban development in the Korean context has involved the dominance 
of the nation state and a hierarchy between the government and businesses. Especially for 
new town development and mega-city projects, the nation state has controlled hiring or 
strongly intervened in the activities of businesses (Grange and Jung, 2004; Kim and Kim, 
2000). Based in part on the weakness of the private sector and working classes in the 
processes of industrialization and urbanization, the state enacted the Land Expropriation Act 
in 1962. The act enabled the state to access or take over land for its industrial and urban 
development projects by expropriating land for both industrial development and commercial 
residential development. National economic growth has been a powerful ideology in South 
Korea for decades, ever since the end of World War II and the division of Korea into North 
and South during and after the Korean War. The hostile division between South and North 
Korea motivated and strengthened discourses of national competitiveness. The discourse of 
globalization has further promoted the ideology of national competitiveness. 
Because of its characteristics during the state-led industrialization periods of the 
1960s and 1970s, some scholars have examined the politics of urban development in South 
Korea from within the framework of the developmental state. (Park, 1998; 2003; Sonn, 2007; 
Kong, 2000; Saito, 2003; Bae and Sellers, 2007) 9 The characteristics of a developmental 
state include a blurred boundary between public and private sectors, a focus on nationalistic 
collective interest,  economic development as a primary logic of legitimacy, strong plan-
rationality, and an autonomous, technocratic system (Saito, 2003: 289–290; Tsukamoto, 
2012). A developmental state receives public support for spatial strategies based on national 
competitiveness (Harvey, 2005). Developmental state theory, however, is controversial, and 
                                                     
9 It is beyond the scope of this study to clarify if the developmental state theory is flawed and if South Korean 
state is still one. We note that South Korea has had a developmental state legacy because the nation state has 
been relatively dominant in urban development. 
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some criticize it for having an overly simplified view of a state-autonomous system (Chang, 
2003). 
Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that the political economy of postwar South 
Korea was in fact at least state-led. Interventions in market mechanisms have been highly 
selective, and the state has worked with and often promoted markets rather than exercise 
direct control (Önis, 1991). However, since the 1990s, there have been some significant 
changes in the operation of the state mainly because of internationalization of business 
activities and labor movements (Minns, 2001). The changes reduced control over the 
domestic market (Pempel, 1999) and produced a shift to knowledge, service, and high-tech 
oriented sectors (Hahm and Plein, 1995; Chung and Kirby, 2002). This suggests that new 
leadership and new partnerships will emerge as part of developments that are more 
decentralized, partnership-based, and internationalized. 
In the Korean context, the transition from the highly centralized developmental state 
to partially decentralized urban development policies took place simultaneously with 
transition for explicit control of urban development by the nation state to the embedded 
dominance of the nation state. (Park, 2008; Sonn, 2010) Urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 
1989) emerged in 1994, at the same time as direct elections for local governments began. A 
number of local governments started the growth-oriented place marketing strategies reflected 
in urban development projects. A legacy of the developmental state, however, remains 
embedded in the political economic structure (Moon and Prasad, 1994). 
The Songdo New City case demonstrates the general applicability of growth regime 
theory. It is not necessarily a long-term stable regime but an instrumental growth regime that 
leads to project realization. The “project realization” occurs under instrumental regimes, 
short-term and project oriented, and achieving a tangible result within these time spans is 
usually critical (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994). Completing specific projects is the common 
purpose shared in such regimes, and it is an incentive for members to cooperate (1993: 201). 
The instrumental regime for project realization is identical to the development regime defined 
by Stone (1998). 
Public-private partnership (Davies, 2003) and regime are sometimes used 
interchangeably (Stoker and Mossberger (1994) and Strange (1993), for example). Strange 
(1993) saw public-private partnership as a process toward developing a regime and suggested 
that the partnership that he studied exhibited tendencies of a symbolic revitalizing regime 
(1993: 371). More distinctively than that, public-private partnerships can be defined in terms 
of “an ideological commitment to collaboration within local authorities” (Davies, 2003: 253) 
as the local authorities consider market-led growth not only positive but also necessary. 
Public-private partnerships are also bureaucratic structures operating under strong central 
government control. 
According to these criteria, the Songdo case fits the framework of the growth regime 
rather than the public-private partnership because key actors have financial interdependence 
(Davies, 2003). They also involve collaboration based on the need to combine resources for 
the power to accomplish tasks beyond a symbolic cooperation (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). 
The regime is an autonomous institution involving shared governing outcomes, not controlled 
by a central government (Davies, 2003). A public-private partnership can be a process toward 
a regime. This paper focuses on the beginning of a growth regime and does not exclude the 
fact that a part of the process is public-private partnerships. 
Despite their useful explanatory power, conventional theories of the urban growth 
regime have room for revision in terms of providing a theoretical framework useful for the 
Songdo case. We propose the construct of a “multi-scalar growth regime” to address some of 
the gaps. First, the main actors of cooperation and coalition add the central government and 
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international private actors (in this case, consisting of a single international company) to the 
typical main dynamics between the urban growth regime, local government, and local private 
businesses. The central government provides authority based on its dominant power and its 
reputation as predominant from its past status as a state-led regime, while the international 
private company provides financial resources. In addition, the politics of the multi-scalar 
growth regime demonstrates different dynamics from that of a standard growth regime. 
 
Scalar tension among multi-scalar actors of the regime 
Despite their common interests surrounding urban growth, the labor division among 
multi-scalar actors is not stable, as each one goes through new dynamics as a project proceeds. 
As the roles of governmental actors and that of non-governmental (usually businesses) actors 
usually differ from one another, a coalition made up of these actors is likely to be based on 
conflict rather than natural cooperation. As Mossberger and Stoker (2001) have pointed out, 
the concept of regime transformation has not been well theorized. We suggest the notion of 
cooperative conflict (Sen, 1990), in which participants have a congruent collective interest 
and are obliged to cooperate despite conflicting interests. It is important to discern not only 
motivations held in common between different actors that lend themselves to cooperation and 
coalition building for governing cities but also the tensions between such actors. 
Under the previous, state-led development regime in Korea, the scalar labor division 
was quite centralized. As the growth regime involved actors from various geographic scales 
(urban, national, and global), tensions as well as cooperation among the multi-scalar actors of 
the new regime was a key feature of the regime (Bae and Sellers, 2007).10 The new regime is 
likely to have a multi-scalar labor division that continues to include the traditionally 
predominant actor, the nation state, with international businesses newly involved, and with 
local government emerging as a new leader as well. Some of the previous roles of the nation 
state are thus transferred to other actors. 
Scholars of state rescaling have focused on the transformation of the nation state’s 
functions and power. The private sector has increased its influence by capturing regulatory 
agencies through personal networks, bribery, political pressure, and the provision of partial 
information (Bernstein, 1955; Laffont & Tirole, 1991; Levine & Forrence, 1990; Stigler, 
1971).11 The voluntary sector has also emerged as an influential actor that participates in the 
decision-making and negotiation process. However, the continued active role of the nation 
state (e.g., Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 2004; Goodwin, Jones, and Jones, 2005; Jones, 2001; 
MacLeod, 2001) has continued to receive attention. These studies see a hollowing-out 
process consisting of selective withdrawal on the part of the state rather than its exclusion 
from local affairs. This selective withdrawal can be part of a strategy for a new form of 
leadership. Authors such as Jessop (1994, 2002) and Brenner (2004) demonstrate that the 
relocation of power from the national to the regional or local scale represents a 
reconfiguration of state power rather than a weakening of the nation state (See also Jones, 
Goodwin, & Jones, 2005; Allen & Cochrane, 2007; Fujita, Forthcoming; MacLeod & Jones, 
2007; Park, B-G 2008 for similar views.). 
State rescaling from the view of regime theory (Bulkeley, 2005; MacLeod & Goodwin, 
1999; MacLeod & Jones, 1999; Peck & Tickell, 1992; Jonas & Ward, 2007) effectively 
demonstrates the dynamics of scalar practices. The rescaling in multi-scalar regimes is 
constituted not only by rescaling upward (from the local to the global, for example) and 
                                                     
10 Base and Sellers (2007) expressed what we refer to as “different scales” as “different levels.” 
11 In a similar vein, political scientists have used the concept of the “iron triangle” to describe how, in the private 
sector, bureaucrats in related areas and national congress members in related commissions share interests (Cater, 
1964; Freeman, 1965; Gais, Peterson, & Walker, 1984; McConnell, 1966; McCool, 1990). 
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downward (from the global to the local, for example) but also by rescaling outward and 
backward (to embrace historical and contextual approaches) (Reed and Bruyneel, 2010). 
Rescaling “inward” (within the nation state) also takes place as different interests and 
competition develop within the nation state. Within the seemingly coherent boundary of any 
organization (including the state), there are actually individuals and groups of individuals 
whose interests do not necessarily coincide with that of the whole organization (Powell, 
1990). 
The state is a set of networks12 instead of as a cohesive unit with a singular agenda, 
and intra-state conflicts originate from the diverse interests that exist within the state. The 
literature on bureaucratic politics shows that bureaucrats are likely to have an individual 
agenda, which often contrasts with that of the state (Allison and Halperin, 1972; Carpenter, 
2010). Niskanen (1974) and Bendor and Moe (1985) show that the main agenda of 
bureaucrats is likely to feature a bigger budget, more personnel, and greater responsibilities, 
rather than serve the government’s policy objectives. These heterogeneous interests and 
potential conflicts within the state (Cox, 1998; Mair and Cox, 1991) make state elites attempt 
to consolidate the individuals and groups within the state organization via various 
methodologies called the “state project,” although such attempts are only ever partially 
successful (Jessop, 1990). While such differences in interests lead to conflict, they can also 
lead to collaboration between scales. For example, elected officials in the nation state would 
be motivated to take the side of local interests to get votes in the next election from local 
constituencies (Stratmann & Baur, 2002). 
As the dynamics of the tensions that exist between structural forces and actors’ 
practices constitute state rescaling (Marston, 2000), power relations among actors are 
likewise constantly redefining, contesting, and reconstructing the dynamics (Abidin, 
forthcoming; Delaney & Leitner, 1997; Silver, 2009). Scalar practices shape and, at the same 
time, are shaped by the structure of social interactions (Smith, 1992). The geographical scale 
of actors and power structures in their social relations are intertwined in the politics of scale 
(Swyngedouw, 1997, p. 169). Power is exercised based on existing scales but is rarely stable 
(Cox and Mair, 1991; Cox and Wood). This is because actors make policy, resolve conflicts, 
negotiate, and renegotiate at a scale that is most favorable to their interests (Jessop, 2009). 
A highly centralized state can pursue economic development at an urban scale by, for 
instance, involving itself in urban regeneration schemes (Park, 2008). Powerful non-state 
actors, such as transnational corporations, can attempt to penetrate an existing scale or 
construct a new one. Regime actors involved influence the way that state rescaling unfolds,13 
either knowingly or unknowingly. Discovering how the state is transformed in relation to and 
because of other actors in the process of the emergence of the new growth regime in South 
Korea will contribute to the literature of the politics of urban development with a focus on 
growth regimes and scalar division. 
 
Research Methods 
                                                     
12 A market and a hierarchy are extreme variants that are not likely to exist in the real world. Unlike Weber’s 
(1968) description of a hierarchical organization, for example, those who have a higher rank cannot fully control 
their subordinates’ actions. The distribution of power is asymmetric but never completely concentrated at the top 
of the organization. In that sense, a seeming hierarchy is actually a complicated web of networks featuring 
asymmetrical power relations. The real world market, on the other hand, is often based on transactions among a 
limited number of consumers and producers who care about not only immediate interests but also long-term 
interests, which opens the door for asymmetric power relations. (See also Granovetter, 1985.) 
13 In the post-war era, the national scale became stronger than it had ever been before, dominating other scales 
such as the supra-national or sub-national scale. However, even at that time, political actors were “jumping 
scales” in order to stretch their spatial influence. 
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While our study is theoretically driven, the focus of our fieldwork lies in the grounded 
aspects of how this new governing regime was formed. We cross-examined various sources 
to elucidate the complex politics and partnerships taking shape among elite actors, 
complexities that are not normally visible (and remain somewhat invisible even under the 
sustained inquiry of our research). We conducted archival analysis, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews, participant observations, and site visits. We explored related archival materials, 
such as governmental reports, inter-organizational notes, newspaper articles, books, master 
plans, and meeting minutes. As a supplementary method, we selected eleven interviewees 
from the public sector, governmental research institutes, a local NGO, and a print media 
organization. The selection of the interviewees was from our investigation of reputation by 
asking who people involved in the project thought were key participants. Interview questions 
included who initiated the project, who joined later, how their divisions of division took 
shape, who dominated and how, and what kinds of incentives and conflicting interests 
different actors carried. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the interviews.  




Like other technologically advanced East Asian mega cities,14 the Seoul metropolitan 
area expanded rapidly. Throughout the period beginning with the start of rapid development 
in the 1960s through to the present day, the state has faced chronic housing shortages and 
unaffordable rises in the price of housing. The state has responded with a variety of programs, 
starting with the Land Readjustment Act in 1966 and the Land Readjustment projects 
(Grange and Jung, 2004). The state set up the Korea Land Development Corporation for the 
purposes of land expropriation and the Korea National Housing Corporation for the 
construction of public housing. These state-owned enterprises have monopolized land and 
housing development projects. 
The housing system, and its ability to meet the housing needs of Koreans, has become 
a political issue. In the late 1980s, the Roh Tae Woo government (1988–1993) responded by 
pursuing the construction of two million housing units in five years in the capital 
metropolitan region and building more than ten new towns in Seoul’s neighboring areas. 
Located within a 25-kilometer radius from the city center of Seoul, the first generation of five 
new towns (Bundang, Ilsan, Pyeongchon, Sanbon, and Jungdong) achieved the target of two 
million new housing units.15 
The private sector has been increasingly involved in the housing development process, 
starting in the 1980s, providing new housing on a massive scale. The state and construction 
companies have had a close relationship as part of this increased involvement (Park, 1998; 
Kim and Ahn, 2002). Increasing deregulation and marketization have taken place in the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. The private sector has pressured the government to 
deregulate planning schemes, especially the greenbelt policy, and the decrees regulating the 
Seoul Capital Region based on the Capital Region Management Law (Kim, 1999). The state, 
in the end, did deregulate the greenbelts for the construction of a second generation of new 
town projects. 
                                                     
14 These are cities that have experienced substantial economic growth and urban development based on well-
defined administrative and political jurisdictions. They are also characterized as statist systems of land and 
housing development and as involving strong national political organizations as well as extensive national land 
use policies (Laquian, 2005; Bae and Sellers, 2007). 




Compared to the prototypes of new town developments, Songdo has had a number of 
contrasting features, although these have changed over time. The Incheon city government 
initiated the reclamation of wetlands in order to develop an international new city in the 
1980s. At that time, Incheon city was afflicted with an outdated industrial structure and was 
seeking a new model of development to distance itself from its traditional reliance on the 
manufacturing industry. The Incheon city government concluded a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) that went into effect later in 2001. This MOU was made with Gale & 
Wentworth Company, a US firm that specializes in real estate development. With such 
support, the city government persuaded the nation state to provide legal and financial support. 
In terms of the institutional structures of Free Economic Zones, there is an Incheon Free 
Economic Zone Authority at the local (city) scale. There is also a Free Economic Zone 
Planning Office of the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy at the national scale and, at the 
regional scale, a regional Free Economic Zone headquarters in each region with a Free 
Economic Zone (Kim, 2006). 
The Incheon Free Economic Zone covers a total area of 209 square kilometers, 51,755 
acres (representing a third of the geographic area of Seoul), and is comprised of the Songdo, 
Cheongna, and Yeongjong districts. The Incheon Free Economic Zone is to be home, once it 
is complete, to a planned population of 480,000, and the Incheon city government anticipates 
spending approximately $15 billion toward building up infrastructure during the 
implementation period of the Zone, spanning 2003 to 2020 (Incheon City Government and 
Ministries of the Knowledge Economy, 2007). Figure 1 shows the location of Songdo as well 
as details of Songdo International City, as well as the developmental plan for the Incheon 
Free Economic Zone. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
There were several unique factors to the Songdo development project.” First, it 
targeted the enhancement of regional and national competitiveness by attracting foreign direct 
investment. Second, it is a product of complicated interactions between the national and city 
governments. Third, an international private investor, Gale & Wentworth Company, a US 
firm, something that had previously been unheard of in Korea’s planning history, was also 
involved as a key actor (Kim & Ahn, 2006). 
 
The formation of the multi-scalar growth regime of the Songdo development 
Insight into regime systems can derive from looking over longer timeframes (Reed 
and Bruyneel, 2010). Over the past twenty-four years, between 1986 and 2010, the 
partnership among actors has become increasingly complicated. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 indicates the emergence of the urban growth regime and the changes in the 
makeup of the Songdo development’s key actors over time. As the number of actors and their 
different interests increases, the importance of partnership increases dramatically as well. The 
formation of the multi-scalar growth regime of the Songdo development took place in the 
following ways, as emerged from an analysis of our interviews.16 The Songdo growth regime 
                                                     
16 For a better understanding of the major events that took place during development, please see the timeline in 
Appendix 1, which summarizes them. 
10 
 
demonstrates financial interdependence and autonomy in the institutional setting along with 
features of an instrumental growth regime. 
First, the emergence of the Incheon city government as an active actor was noticeable 
in terms of downward state rescaling. In the late 1980s, some local officials took the initiative, 
devising an entrepreneurial vision to transform Incheon into an international city by using the 
airport and reclaiming land (Park, 2008). The biggest barrier was the Capital Region 
Management Law, enacted in 1984 (Lee & Shin, 2012, p. 1338), which controlled the urban 
growth of Seoul, Incheon, and the surrounding Gyeonggi province. To receive the exceptional 
approval of the nation state to build outside of the restrictions of this law, those who wanted 
to start new developments contacted the president of Korea at the time, Chun Doo-hwan 
(1980–1988), directly. Because of growth regulation, it took fifteen years (1986–2001) to 
receive approval to reclaim the land for the purposes of the new Songdo development. 
For a while after approval, the city staff seemed to avoid a tight-knit connection to the 
nation state. It should be noted, though, that there were different opinions within the Incheon 
city government at any given time, and different mayors of the city over time had different 
directions they wanted to pursue. Mayor Ahn Sang Soo (2002–2010), from the conservative 
Hannara Party, led the development of Songdo and was consistently enthusiastic about it. The 
next mayor, Song Yeong Gil (2010–2014), representing the Democratic Party, was critical 
about the development and increasing inequality between Songdo and the old city center of 
Incheon. He said that the business district had decreased by 38 percent, such that the Incheon 
Free Economic Zone had become a bedroom community (Hankook Kyungje, June 4, 2010).  
Second, the most notable characteristic of the exchange politics of the new regime 
was international private developers’ participation. As the sole actor, the city government 
focused on attracting international investment and constructing residential buildings (Incheon 
Ilbo, January 15, 2001; Lee, 2005). The private developers represented 39 out of 46 trillion 
won invested between 2003 and 2009, while the public sector invested the remaining 7 
trillion won. A report written by the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority (2010) stated 
that the Incheon Free Economic Zone development would not be possible without 
collaboration with private developers.17 Governmental actors had access to financial 
resources and focused on inducing action instead of commanding action. In return, the 
international developers expected partial authority over planning and profits from 
development. Such exchange politics was critical in the formation of the growth regime. 
Expanding to non-governmental international actors demonstrated the nature and presence of 
tendencies toward outward state rescaling (Reed and Bruyneel, 2010) and the formation of 
the regime. 
New Songdo International City Development LLC (NSIC)18 comprises Gale 
International, a managing partner, and The Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), which 
is a domestic Korean company. NSIC made a contract to purchase the land, revise the land 
use plan, obtain approval from the nation state, and implement property development. NSIC 
constructed a park, a golf course, an art center, a convention center, a trade tower, and a hotel, 
focusing on overall quality of life to attract businesses.19 NSIC also contributed to boosting 
Songdo’s reputation by putting it in the spotlight. 
                                                     
17 An Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority journal (2010) emphasizes that the development does not come 
from citizens’ tax but from land selling (7%), the nation state (5%), and from private developers (88%). 
18 “NSIC is a joint venture company established in March 2002 by The Gale Company LLC (a.k.a. Gale 
International) and POSCO Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd. for the purpose of developing the International 
Business District in Songdo International City” (NSIC website 
http://www.songdoulife.com/English/what/partners.html. visited on June 7, 2011). 
19 Interviewees 5, 6, and 7, all members of the Free Economic Zone Authority, argued that if it had been the 
Korean Land and Housing Corporation that had been in charge during previous new town developments, they 
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The emergence of the local government and that of international developers and 
increasing partnership developed the process toward the formation of a growth regime. It 
should be noted, however, those changes brought about new tension so cooperative conflict 
relations developed. The tension emerged surrounding the growth regulation of Songdo 
between the city government and the national Ministry of the Knowledge Economy. The city 
government was supportive of less regulation on the development by NSIC because the 
development would bring public facilities to Songdo. The nation state’s20 approach depended 
on what role the nation state thought Songdo played in national development. Because the 
Incheon Free Economic Zone was subject to the new apartment price ceiling system21 as well 
as capital region regulations, NSIC asked for deregulation for the Incheon Free Economic 
Zone in order to proceed more quickly (Dong-A Newspaper, April 6, 2010). The interview 
with NSIC, including Stan Gale, the chair (Dong-A Newspaper, April 6, 2010), showed a 
strongly critical tone toward the higher Corporation Tax (22%) than Hong Kong (17%) and 
Singapore (18%) and regulations on the activities of private businesses in South Korea. The 
developer also criticized that although it completed the construction of the Chadwick 
International School, it could not open the school because of regulations on foreign 
investment. As a result of deregulation, the percentage of domestic students increased from 
10 percent to 30 percent (Asia Kyungje Newspaper, February 10, 2010). Gyeonggi province 
was also vocal in supporting deregulation. 
Another cooperative conflict existed between the Incheon Free Economic Zone 
Authority and NSIC. In terms of hierarchical positions, the Incheon Free Economic Zone 
Authority was considered senior to NSIC (Interviewees 2 and 5). Unlike a typical relationship 
between a payer and a payee in Korean business culture, however, there was plenty of room 
for the company to drive the process in the direction it wanted (Lee, 2005), and some former 
staff members of the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority were recruited by NSIC. Some 
interviewees (Interviewees 2, 5, and 6) assumed that their contribution to NSIC was 
strategically underhanded. In principle, NSIC was expected to discuss matters with the nation 
state only via the Incheon Free Economic Zone. Sometimes; however, NSIC wanted to 
negotiate directly with the nation state in a rather confidential way (Interviewee 3). 
Third, it is also important to investigate the continued dominance and competition of 
the nation state (The Blue House and administrative ministries) over the regime. The nation 
state’s power of approval has made its involvement quite influential, although it is not 
involved in the implementation of the project. For example, when Incheon wanted to attract 
Portman’s investment to build the landmark of the Incheon Free Economic Zone, a 151-
storey twin building, the city of Incheon had to get the nation state’s approval (Interviewee 3). 
After the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997, the nation state became supportive of 
Songdo’s local development because the state saw the urban development of a few selected 
cities as a key engine for national economic growth. The state suggested leveraging the 
opportunity to become a Free Economic Zone and decided on the direction and the initiative22 
that the city government drafted. Then the two groups met to discuss it. Through the Board of 
Audit and Inspection, the nation state has assessed outcomes of the development. The 
                                                                                                                                                                     
would have built only housing and a park. 
20 Because the city government has no right to create or change law, this communication took place between 
NSIC and the nation state. 
21 The new apartment price-ceiling system was legislated in 2005 and implemented as a tool to mediate inequity 
in the housing market. Growth regulations that encompassed Incheon included the new apartment price-ceiling 
system and the capital region regulation. 
22 The plan was made in a similar fashion to usual land-use plans because there was no model in the Korean 
context for a Free Economic Zone. 
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Incheon Free Economic Zone has not been independently assigned because financial 
independence was not established.  
Regarding financial support, interviewees’ perceptions of the nation state’s role varied. 
Over six years, spanning 2003–2009, the entire cost was 46 trillion won, among which the 
nation state’s financial contribution was 2 trillion and the city government’s 5 trillion. One 
interviewee (Interviewee 5) contended that the nation state’s financial support was not 
significant. What the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority wanted, he said, was 
deregulation, not financial aid, from the nation state (Incheon Free Economic Zone, 2009).23 
For instance, the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority appealed to the National Assembly 
to get an exemption from price controls on new apartments and the advanced sale system, 
which had been key tools of state regulation (Lee & Shin, 2012; Kim & Kim, 2000). The 
Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority was rather conscious of the power of the 
international developers who contributed financially by providing a convention center and a 
park. Despite local perceptions, the nation state spent half of its total Incheon Free Economic 
Zone budget on the Songdo development. According to another interviewee (Interviewee 11), 
without the nation state’s financial aid, it would not have been such a fast, widely known, and 
large-scale reclamation. 
Fourth, local civic organizations played the role of an anti-growth regime, but they 
did not make a big difference in the formation of the growth regime. A number of national 
and local civic organizations organized a civil measure committee to oppose the Free 
Economic Zone law in a forum in 2003 (Incheon Civil Measure Committee, 2003). They 
criticized the Free Economic Zone policy of the Kim Dae Jung and the Roh Moo Hyun 
regimes as a neoliberal, pro-capital policy exacerbating problems in terms of labor rights, 
environmental regulation, and public education. Later, in 2004, the Ministry of the 
Knowledge Economy designated Songdo as one of the six promising Free Economic Zones, 
which made opposition pointless as its implementation became inevitable. Civic 
organizations either became supportive of the development’s direction or lost interest in it. 
Then, they grew cynical, as the nature of the development kept changing as the amount of 
land reclamation increased, as universities instead of businesses moved in, and as housing-
oriented development began. Despite their influence in the narratives of the popular media, 
civic organizations did not play a leading role in the development or in the decision-making, 
as their financial and political resources were limited. 
 
 
Scalar tension in the multi-scalar growth regime 
The new regime of the Songdo development was a nexus where dynamic rescaling 
renegotiated the boundaries of the activities of various actors. Two newly emerging actors, 
the local governmental actor (Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority) and the international 
developers (NSIC) mainly constituted the growth regime. In the early stage of the growth 
regime formation, the state rescaling took place both upward and downward. The later stage 
after the Asian Economic Crisis witnessed continuing path dependence. The nation state 
challenged the rescaling through the following claims: (1) The chair of the authority is 
influenced by the nation state; (2) the nation state attempted to take the Incheon Free 
Economic Zone Authority to the national scale; and (3) the nation state was empowered by 
the right to make Free Economic Zone selections. 
                                                     
23 In any case, financial support from the nation state is not guaranteed; as stated in official documents, the 
nation state may support the project, and it may not. So, Incheon Free Economic Zone has had to struggle to 
gain support on a year-by-year basis (Interviewee 7). 
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Although the power of making appointments to positions within the bureaucracy of 
the Free Economic Zone officially belonged to the city government, because the three former 
chairs had previously worked in the nation state, interviewees considered these chairs to have 
belonged to the nation state. Based on this trend, many believed that the nation state was 
appointing its own people to the Free Economic Zone chair. Compared to the Special 
Economic Zone authority in China, which is relatively independent from the nation state and 
the city government, the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority is under the direct influence 
of the city government and is governed by the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy and other 
ministries of the nation state (Kwon, 2007).  
The nation state started to grow concerned when one of the former chairs of the 
Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority complained that the authority should be independent 
and that the mayor and the city parliament represented barriers to achieving goals. At one 
point, the nation state wanted to appoint the director, a decision that brought about strong 
resistance from the city government, according to Interviewee 5. As the solution, the nation 
state sends a director candidate for consideration, and the city government ultimately makes 
the decision to appoint the director of the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority. 
Second, the nation state once tried to install a Special Purpose City government to put 
the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority under nation state control (Hangyere Newspaper, 
July 23, 2006). This attempt to form a local agency (Bayirbağ, 2010) failed, blocked by harsh 
objections from the city government. This incident epitomized the complexity of the 
institutional environment of the Songdo project today, highlighting the shift from local 
initiatives and national reluctance to national dominance and local resistance. The effects of 
this incident and the tension continued in the aftermath, a number of interviewees said.24 The 
nation state is still currently interested in making the Free Economic Zone independent from 
the Incheon government. Because national law allows for that kind of change, the nation state 
is legally capable of making that decision. 
Although the nation state stated its involvement was not a matter of dominance, this 
competition seemed to be a very sensitive issue for both the city government and the 
authority. Additionally, the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy initiated the Incheon Free 
Economic Zone system as part of the process of the Ministry’s expansion (Kwon, 2007). 
Most of the interview subjects said that the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy had 
attempted to expand its influence over the Incheon Free Economic Zone. 
A majority of the interviewees agreed that the actors, especially the nation state and 
the city government, rarely took action unless an urgent matter arose. Because there was no 
official communication channel between the national and the city governments, the usual 
modes of communication included calling on the telephone and discussing matters over a 
meal. These interviewees attributed the lack of communication to the nature of Korean 
bureaucrats, who are reluctant to take any action beyond their required responsibilities.  
The tension remains ongoing, as the following statement indicates: 
                                                     
24 A different interpretation from our interviewees was that the intention of the nation state, especially the Free 
Economic Zone Planning Office, was to enhance the autonomy of the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority, 
not to take it over (Interviewee 10). The nation state’s view was that the authority’s dependency on the city 
government makes things more complicated. Moreover, a Free Economic Zone as a Special Purpose City 
government would better be able to attract foreign capital and would work for other Free Economic Zones like 
Pudong and Shanghai in China. A Free Economic Zone can be independent from both the local and nation 
states. Another interview subject said that because the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority is located in the 
local (Incheon) sector, local council is also involved. Hence, development is not being implemented efficiently. 
He said that if the nation state were to take control of the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority, it would be 
easy to gain financial support and outside trust. 
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Communication between Incheon [government] and [the] Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy is rare. The Ministry of Knowledge Economy wants to take the Incheon Free 
Economic Zone Authority under their purview while Incheon avoids talking with them 
[Ministry of the Knowledge Economy], it seems. If Incheon had a financial problem, the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy would be able to take over the institution while 
stepping in to financially support it [the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority]. 
(Interviewee 2, Governmental Research Institute, April 12, 2010). 
As a ministry for the national economy, the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy used 
to be uninvolved in spatial strategy. However, the Free Economic Zone Planning Office of the 
Ministry of the Knowledge Economy was responsible for changing and approving the 
development plans of Songdo International City. The Ministry of Land, Transport and 
Maritime Affairs usually led accommodations to legal and institutional frameworks for new 
town developments. Such a large development has in the past been funneled through the 
Central Urban Planning Committee for Decision-Making and Assessment, but in the case of 
Free Economic Zones, it has been the Free Economic Zone Committee that has played this 
role. This committee includes ministers and university professors, and the chair is the 
minister of the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy.  
Inward rescaling took place as tension between the Ministry of the Knowledge 
Economy and the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs increased. Because the 
Free Economic Zone laws were initiated by the Ministry of the Knowledge Economy while 
the development process was led by the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, 
their roles caused conflict and were henceforth redefined. The Ministry of Land, Transport 
and Maritime Affairs, however, ignored the legislations and made the Ministry of the 
Knowledge Economy go through the Central Urban Planning Committee for their 
development proposals to obtain approval in cases of designation and other changes. The 
Ministry of the Knowledge Economy also divided land for management, with each division 
having rather independent decision-making power over its own land.  
Third, it is worth noting that the nation state’s economic strategy to overcome the 
Asian Economic Crisis effected a power shift from a selected city, Incheon, to a selector, the 
nation state. The influence of the nation state, particularly in the shape of the Ministry of the 
Knowledge Economy, was visible when it assessed six Free Economic Zones and removed 
weak Free Economic Zones (90.51 km² in total) from the list (Asia Economy Newspaper 
[Asia Kyungje], February 8, 2011). The nation state decided to focus on certain selected 
zones, including Songdo, as the top priority (Jung Ang Newspaper [Jung Ang Ilbo], January 
26, 2011; Asia Economy Newspaper [Asia Kyungje], February 8, 2011). There was a clear 
recognition of the state’s legal and institutional power. Regarding the importance of the 
state’s power and role, Interviewee 10 noted, 
The nation state designated six Free Economic Zones in total. Isn’t [that] the influence 
and power of the nation state’s decisions? Taxation reduction, the kind of industries to 
attract—these decisions all come from the national [government]. (April 23, 2010) 
Such roles as a developmental state were possible in the discourse of national crises, 
including the postwar recovery and competition with North Korea. The national economic 
crisis brought about the reemergence of the nation state as an umpire in competitions among 
cities. Getting financial support, especially for infrastructure, became extremely competitive 
among the six Free Economic Zones. There was a competition among these Zones for funds 
so limited as to be insufficient for even one project. Local actors must therefore make an 
effort to confirm receipt of support for their facilities every year by contacting the national 
assembly and other institutions, Interviewee 7 argued. For example, the construction of the 
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underground speed train that carries people from Songdo to Seoul station in thirty minutes 
had a tremendous price tag attached to it, and the local actors hope to get as much financial 
support as possible from the nation state. 
One essential question about the new growth regime and the complicated partnerships 
is who plays the role of coordinator in the scalar tension? The shift from the nation state to 
the multi-scalar growth regime means that the nature of leadership has changed, coordination 
becoming an essential role in need of a leader. However, the role of coordination has not yet 
clearly manifested itself. There are not many examples of conflict coordination, but a rare one 
is in the construction of the Incheon Bridge.25 The nation state (The Ministry of Land, 
Transport and Maritime Affairs) wanted to build a 700-meter long bridge. The local port 
business argued that to minimize economic harm to shipping companies, it should be 1000 
meters long, which would make it so that ships would not have to make a detour, which they 
would were the bridge to be built at only 700 meters. This extended length would increase the 
price tag an extra 100 million won and extend the construction period an additional year. 
Ultimately, a compromise between the nation state and the residents was reached for an 800-
meter bridge. The nation state and the city government split the extra cost 50/50. At that time, 
different ministries had different points of view on the matter. The Ministry of Transportation 
wanted to build the bridge as soon as possible. The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries, (MOMAF) supported the extension of the bridge, while the Ministry of the 
Knowledge Economy did not want to spend more money. In this case, the prime minister’s 
office made the coordination efforts. 
The national assembly played the role of informal coordinator, interviewees said. If a 
conflict arose between the central and the local actors, the local actors would depend on the 
national assembly, to which they sent briefings. Although it did not play a significant role, it 
was able to initiate laws. Local actors (the Free Economic Zone and the city government) as 
well as the nation state depended substantially on the assembly to change and maintain 
present laws. The assembly could conduct an investigation of the government. To avoid 





The Songdo New City development has witnessed a new form of growth regime that 
embraces partnership among multi-scalar actors. It has also showed the interface between the 
new politics of urban development and the path dependent dominance of the state in the 
South Korean context. Our findings demonstrate, first, that an increasing number of actors 
from various scales have become involved over time and have begun to form a new 
instrumental growth regime for project realization. This new growth regime has resulted from 
the downward rescaling of the former initiative of the nation state to the local scale, followed 
by a subsequent upward rescaling to the national scale again. In addition to the nation state 
and the city government, the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority, international 
developers, the national assembly, domestic developers, and civic organizations became 
involved. As well, the state attempted to make the Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority a 
Special Purpose City government. Although this approach failed, it indicated the state’s 
                                                     
25 The Incheon Bridge, opening in October 2009, provides direct access between Songdo and Incheon 
International Airport. It is the longest-spanning cable-stayed bridge in South Korea. The sea-crossing bridge 
section was funded by the private sector. Korea Expressway Corporation and the national government’s Ministry 
of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs managed the project. 
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interest in regaining dominance and highlighted the tensions that exist between the state and 
the city government. 
Our findings on this particular type of growth regime propose the following 
theoretical considerations. First, the formation of a growth regime is contextualized in a 
particular spatio-temporal logic in which statehood is rescaled to local and global scales. The 
multi-scalar growth regime in the case of Songdo belongs to the category of instrumental 
regime that pursues a target project, short-term and growth-oriented. An essential factor to 
constitute such a regime is the entrepreneurialism of the local government. The 
entrepreneurialism in our case comes partly from the tradition of the developmental state, 
which was downward rescaled to the local scale. 
Second, reconsidering the boundaries of a regime is critical in looking at 
contemporary growth politics through growth regime theory. Expanding the boundaries of 
city governance beyond governmental actors was one of the critical contributions of regime 
theory. The concept of the multi-scalar growth regime questions who is in and who is out in 
terms of the roles in exchange politics and influence. Forming a multi-scalar growth regime 
has entailed rearranging previous networks that accompanied conflicts based on different 
interests and different scales. The boundaries issue also helps to specify relevant actors within 
a regime. The boundaries question redefines the notion of governing. The formation of a 
growth regime in collaboration with multiple sectors at multiple levels of scale influences the 
dominance and leadership style of the government. 
Regime theory has focused on exchange politics and cooperation in the interests of 
common goals. This was an effect, mainly, of the fact that stable networks based on the long-
term development contract and cooperation in the interests of urban growth were something 
new. However, elaborating the cooperation process often reveals that the boundary of 
different interests and the cooperation that they effect within a regime develops and evolves. 
A growth regime bears tension between interests held in common between different actors 
and conflicting interests from the start. The conflict aspect is an essential part of the 
cooperative conflict process (Sen, 1990, 1999), during which power relations matter and 
membership in a regime becomes clear. 
Regime theory has focused on exchange politics and cooperation in the interests of 
common goals. This was an effect, mainly, of the newness of their stable networks based on 
the long-term development contract and cooperation in the interests of urban growth. 
However, elaborating the cooperation process often reveals that the boundary of different 
interests and the cooperation that they effect within a regime develops and evolves. A growth 
regime, from the start, bears tension between interests held in common between different 
actors and conflicting interests. The conflict aspect is an essential part of the cooperative 
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Table 1 Changes of regime over time 
 
 1986-1988 1989-2001 2002 2003-2010 
Key actors  City government
  































affiliation Interview date Interview 
place 
Interviewer(s) 
1 Media April 8, 2010 Office Shin 
2 Governmental 
Research Institute 
April 12, 2010 Office Shin 
3 Governmental 
Research Institute 
April 12, 2010 Office Shin 
4 Civil society April 13, 2010 Office Park, Shin 
5 The Incheon Free 
Economic Zone 
authority 
April 13, 2010 Office Park, Shin 
6 The Incheon Free 
Economic Zone 
authority 
April 13, 2010 Office Park, Shin 
7 The Incheon Free 
Economic Zone 
authority 
April 13, 2010 Office Park, Shin 
8 The Incheon Free 
Economic Zone 
authority (former) 
April 15, 2010 Office Sonn, Shin 
9 The Incheon Free 
Economic Zone 
authority (former) 
April 15, 2010 Office Shin 
10 The Free Economic 
Zone Planning Office 
April 23, 2010 Office Shin 
11 Governmental 
Research Institute 






<Fig. 1> The Location of Songdo and a View of Songdo International City and 
developmental plan for Incheon Free Economic Zone 




Appendix 1: Timeline 
1985: Local bureaucrats persuaded the Mayor of Inchon for the reclamation of the land for 
the development of a Northeast Asian Business Hub for Songdo.  
1987: The Business Hub plan was reported to the president with no effect. 
1987: The presidential candidate Roh Taewoo’s election manifest included two important 
built environment projects that would influence the Songdo project: 1) the 
construction plans for two million houses and 2) a plan for the Inchon International 
Airport. 
1988:  The Roh Taewoo Administration was inaugurated. 
1988: Local bureaucrats changed the title of the Songdo development to Songdo New City in 
an effort to emphasize the housing element of the project. 
1992: The Inchon Government completed the Songdo district development plan. 
1996: The Media Valley Project was rejected by the Inchon Local Assembly. 
1997: The East Asian economic crisis hit South Korea. 
2001: The Inchon International Airport was completed. 
2001: The Inchon Government exchanged MOU with Gale & Wentworth Company . 
2002: President Kim Daejoong announced his support for the Songdo project as a free 
economic zone and promised the provision of the physical infrastructure. 
2002: Media started to criticize the Incheon Government for increasing the housing element 
of the Songdo project.  
2002: The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration was inaugurated. The new administration 
announced its vision for a Northeast Asian Economic Hub Nation. Under this vision, 
the administration supported the idea of a free economic zone in Songdo. 
2004: Songdo and two districts near Songdo were designated as Inchon Free Economic Zones, 
along with the other five areas across the country. 
 
  
 
